Whose Nation is it Really?

We are not lone individuals engaged in a struggle against nature, but social animals, who have our individual rights to liberty in a free country, but who are nevertheless part of a wider society, culture and economy. We have the right to expect the support of the society around us, which is why we also have the duty to uphold it to the extent that it protects us from the depredations of nature and wild animals and the bad behaviour of other human beings. Society is not meant to be a war of all against all, but a coming together of human beings in a way that promotes the good of each of them.

This is not a majoritarian concept. Society does not exist to promote the good of the majority at the expense of a minority. It ought to hold real benefits for every single member of the polity. This is the reason why the nation-state is important in terms of social freedom: the natural bands and connections of a real society—cultural ties—allow for greater latitude to individual freedom in a nation-state than does the creation of a “society” of warring cultural groups constantly intervened in by a lumpen bureaucracy that seeks social division and conflict as the price of its sinecurist monopolisation of social revenues.

Nations vs. nationalities

Nations are not artificially created: a European directive announcing that all Europeans were henceforth to be considered a single nation would not make it so. The roots of real nations are not in legislation or bureaucratic regulations, but are lost in the mists of time. We are who we are because only extensive historical research can reveal the origins of our nation, and the same thing is so for all other real nations too. We have a common history, common ancestry, a common language, a common culture, common religious roots, as well as understood mores and social expectations. None of this can be created by bureaucratic will.

In the case of the English, we know that the Angles, Saxons and Jutes arrived in England in the fifth century, speaking closely related dialects of Old English, and that from the middle of the seventh century the Church of England united them. It is not necessary to be a believer in religion today for this to have significance: many cultural assumptions derive from our religious roots. The “law of the land”—English Common Law—was not promulgated by some emperor or potentate, but derived from the customs of the English people before the Norman Conquest in 1066. The monarchy traces its roots back to the Saxon chieftains of the sixth century. This is not a nation created by Parliament.

To be part of the English nation is a very great thing to the English, and arguably something that attracts widespread respect throughout the world. We have given the world our language; we were the first industrial country, with a disproportionate number of key inventions to our name; our political set-up has been propagated throughout the world; and England is the “mother country” of countless states beyond the seas. In 1900, or indeed at any time before the late 1960s, it would have been no exaggeration—just the truth—to say that England was the greatest nation in the world.

So if we are English, where does the concept of Britishness come in? Historians tell us that England under Roman rule in the early centuries of the first millennium was called Britannia—the Roman province did not include much of Scotland—but the island of Great Britain was never politically united before 1707. Yet the unification of Britain was not artificial: England and Scotland had much in common, including descent from the Anglo-Saxons, Celts and Vikings; the English language; the monarchy; and our rejection of the dominance of Rome at the time of the Reformation. Great Britain worked because it was not the union of incompatible parts. Had England and Somalia been conjoined in a union got up by the politicians, it would never have been felt to be a true nation. England and Scotland, while each retaining their older national identities, became a composite British nation, which stood the test of time. The fact that politicians cannot decree the limits of a nation is shown by Britain’s history in Ireland: the political desire to make Ireland part of the Union could not override cultural and historical conflicts on the ground. The composite nation of Great Britain depended on the dominance of England in the Union, a dominance long accepted in Scotland and Wales, but never accepted on the ground in the Gaelic parts of Ireland.

A great nation was created in 1707, fusing, but not destroying, the compatible component nations of England and Scotland, nations whose populations ultimately had similar origins. The Union was nonetheless clearly rooted in the constitution and political values of England. Freedom is particularly associated with England, rather than Scotland, and the grounding of the British nation in an English concept of liberty is clear from the words of the patriotic song Rule, Britannia!:

The nations, not so blest as thee,
Must, in their turns, to tyrants fall:
While thou shalt flourish great and free,
The dread and envy of them all.

These words are rarely heard today, because they contradict the multicultural ideology being coercively promoted by the British state. Not only does multiculturalism unpick the cultural bands that unite the British population—thus pointing, logically, to the dissolution of the Union eventually—it alters the nature of Britishness into an artificial creation of the state. If the British government passes a decree that everyone in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, is a British citizen, then to all legal intents and purposes they are so. But the government cannot make them part of our nation, because they lack the identity, the culture, the ancestry, the language, the history and much else to make it so. If these things are held no longer to matter, it can only be because Britishness is now meaningless: the nations we always knew could never be our equals are the source of the growth of our population, and so Britishness is no longer the political expression of the traditionally free culture of England.

We need to be clear on what is happening. Governments hand out nationality, not nationhood. Nationality is a piece of paper from the Home Office; nationhood, by contrast, is something that cannot be decreed, but is elemental, fundamental, natural. Just as American courts claim to be able to “divorce” a child from his parents, overturning the natural order—in reality, he remains his parents’ child, regardless of the estrangement—the British government claims to be able to “graft in” new members of the nation, by handing out nationality. True, adoption laws do allow the state to declare that someone is the child of people who are not his natural parents, but all such cases depend on the successful integration of the child into a loving relationship with a family, and not on an opposition or confrontation between the child and his adoptive parents. Compare the way that multiculturalism encourages new citizens to oppose our culture, thus “grafting in” antagonising and antagonised groups into society, with no intention of encouraging in them the natural growth of the national sentiment that characterises true nationhood.

In the end, nationality is a vertical relationship with the state bureaucracy. People with no British ancestors are declared “British”. People who speak no English, or who have never visited England, or who are seeking to blow us up, have been declared to be “British”, as fully British as you and I, despite the fact that they lack our national identity. We mock ourselves by turning Britishness into a bureaucratic connection with the state. Nationhood is a horizontal relationship between people: people who have things in common. It cannot be faked and its recognition cannot be commanded by the state. It is either there or it is not.

Consequently, we should never accept that being a British citizen makes someone British, and we should never forget that Britishness is a real national identity, and not a fake ‘nationality’, because of the cultural commonalities of England and Scotland. As England and Scotland begin to feel themselves to be separate, the British identity itself seems destined to fall apart, leading to a reversion to the older identities of the English, the Scottish (and the Welsh and Irish too). A civic national identity only works, therefore, when based on real, underlying nationhood.

Ethnic minorities

So what about the many millions of people who possess British passports, but who are not English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish? Clearly, if naturalisation is allowed by the state, or if the immigration of people who are not British is allowed, that does not make the people concerned really British (and definitely does not make them English). It could be argued that small numbers of people, ready to fully assimilate, could become truly British, just as a child adopted when young can often become a genuine member of a new family, where there is no opposition felt between him and his adoptive parents.

It is in this light that we could regard, for example, a French person born in Britain, with British nationality, who has lived all his life in England. To all intents and purposes, he will look, feel and be accepted as English. The graft will have taken. He is very unlikely to be constantly suing the English for discrimination or emphasising his distinctiveness in any other way.

It is not the same with the “ethnic minorities”, who have been encouraged to feel and remain distinctive, while holding out for all the benefits and advantages of British citizenship, and even insulting us by standing for Parliament and trying to inveigle themselves into positions of power in our society. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that such people have valid gripes with the British, that they do indeed face “discrimination” in England. That merely shows that they are seen as separate from us by many of the people who belong to the real historic nations of the British Isles. It proves, without any possibility of contradiction, that they are not British. For them to sue for discrimination, or even expect to be treated as British, is to perpetrate a fraud, to behave in an insolent manner in someone else’s homeland.

Even the self-righteous left-wingers who are seeking to recreate our society along multicultural lines do not argue that the ethnic minorities are no different from us. They see them as different too, but argue that we should “embrace the diversity”. The problem with this is that nations are based on things held in common, not on diversity, and so arguing for the acceptance of ethnic minorities in terms of embracing diversity fails to explain why we should regard them as the same as us, why we should see them as like us, what they have to do with us in the first place. Support for cultural diversity is an admission that they are not British.

Laws preventing us from expressing our feelings on this subject do not change the matter. National identity is instinctive and unforced: when I see an English person, I recognise his common origin with me, without being compelled to do so by the state. Even if we are forced to pay lip-service to the idea that ethnic-minority people are British, or even English, we will still notice the “diversity” of origins, culture and allegiances, and in the final analysis this means that we know they are not really part of our nation. Ethnic-minority people who were born in England are just as likely to play the race card against us, and so we are right to instinctively feel they are different from us, and therefore not British.

The English

If some people belong to ethnic minorities, who, then, are the majority ethnic group in England? Interestingly, there is officially no such ethnic group in England as the English. People from all over the world have recognised ethnic identities: they belong to certain ethnic groups that are recorded in official documents. But the claim that there is an ethnic group called the English is regarded by the state as a challenge to multiculturalism. If there are people who are English, then, logically, England belongs to them. Consequently, we are assigned to the White British category. “White British” is not the name of an ethnic group. It is a racial classification—people with British passports who are “white”—but not a description of an ethnic group to whom this country belongs.

Despite official non-recognition of the English, the decline of Britishness, or its reinvention as a meaningless term for anyone the state chooses to hand out identity papers to, means that most English people now feel more English than British. We are not simply the White British, but in fact the same nation that founded the Kingdom of England in the Dark Ages. It is an interesting question what will happen to the ethnic minorities once Scotland has declared independence and the Kingdom of England resumes its independent existence once again. Few ethnic-minority people claim to be English, rather than British, but I suppose that in an independent England the logic of their situation would be to advance the claim to have become English, not because the unforced consensus of the English was that they were just like us, but because they would have the support of the state in coercing compliance with such a suggestion, which would justify their presence in our country and thus their access to all the good things life in England can provide. Official terms are likely to be concocted to justify this; maybe the White British would become the White English overnight? But in the end, only we can be us: only the English can be the English, and so the question remains why so many millions from all around the world are coming to settle here, and why we are letting them do so.

This is our country

There is nothing repugnant about refusing to recognise the claim made by ethnic-minority people to be British (or English). After all, the small number of English children born in China or Africa do not claim to be Chinese or African. We are not trying to give offence to ethnic-minority people by asserting that we have a national identity, but merely stating the truth. Conversely, ethnic-minority people who claim to be British are indeed trying to remove our status as the titular nation in this country. We are labelled the White British solely in order to placate their demands to be recognised as the Black ‘British’ (and a number of other categories, including ‘British’ Asians and others). They are the ones causing offence by attempting to deny us our national rights. We ought not to assert ourselves in a boorish manner on the national question, but we should stand up for our nation, its territory, culture, laws and freedoms.

Long queues at Heathrow Airport are caused by Britain’s open door policy, and the insistence that many millions of people who have settled in our country and then behaved badly by refusing to assimilate to our culture are equally entitled to free entry to Great Britain. Even more distressing is the politically inspired policy to use members of the ethnic minorities to man our borders and decide whether we can enter our own country. People who behave in this way in another nation’s territory are certainly not well-disposed towards us; they are lording it over us, loving the indignation they provoke in us.

Policemen and judges are now frequently drawn from the ranks of the incomers in what I can only interpret as deliberate insolence, or even racial supremacism, as the insistence that England belongs equally to people of all races is designed to dislodge us from our prior claim. I have never claimed that China does not belong to the Chinese or that Nigeria does not belong to the Nigerians, but these ethnic policemen and judges exercise illegitimate authority over us on the basis of the political viewpoint that Britain does not belong to the so-called White British. My personal view is that there is little to be gained from challenging these individuals, but I would never volunteer to help an ethnic-minority policeman with his inquiries into any matter, no matter how serious. We also have the nonsense of our sporting identity, where we are expected to cheer on black footballers, or Britain’s Olympic team, many of whose members are drawn from the ranks of other nations, including those who should logically be representing Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean. I would prefer to see Britain never win a sporting medal again than to see people who are not members of our nation (although quite possibly “British citizens”) draped in the Union Flag as if they belonged to the historic nations of the British Isles.

I cannot suggest we would be better off like North Korea, with no interaction whatsoever with the world, but Hong Kong provides an example of how a territory can have the deepest economic integration with the world economy without giving away its territory and culture. People from all around the world can travel to Hong Kong, generally without visas, but they are not invited to displace the Chinese population of Hong Kong as the territory’s majority community, and, although many foreigners do take up jobs in the territory’s financial services and other industries, the city remains overwhelmingly Chinese. We could easily have had strong links with the whole of the world, while retaining our own patrimony.

I personally do not accept the legitimacy of the British ‘citizenship’ of people whose ancestors do not come from Europe. People whose ancestors are French, German or from some other closely related European nation are likely to assimilate easily and, within a single generation, become normal, natural members of the British nation, recognised as such by all without coercion. People whose cultures are so distinct from ours that they seek to recreate their societies as enclaves here are simply unassimilable. A nonsense has been made of our citizenship rolls.

We cannot force massive population movements, not least because it behoves us to recognise that our own stupidity has played a role in the demographic overwhelming of our nation. But marriage to or a family relationship with an ethnic-minority person resident here should never be considered grounds for entry to the United Kingdom. I would like to see passports withdrawn from the ethnic minorities, replaced by Permanent Residence cards, which could not be used to vote, stand for political office or bring in spouses or family members. Public employment should be reserved for members of our nation—people of English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish descent—and the social welfare system should also be exclusively for our own people. Ethnic-minority residents who maintain themselves in the private sector (owners of corner shops and the like) would stay. Those who could not maintain themselves without access to public funds in the form of public-sector employment or welfare payments would be left to find their own ways out of our country.

This is not a harsh policy, but in fact the policy employed over the larger part of the world. English people who try to apply for jobs in the Chinese government or who demand Chinese pensions will find themselves knocked back. Just as every family reserves its household funds for members of their own families, we ought to prioritise the welfare of our nation. If we don’t do this, we will lose our position in Britain, and with it our freedoms too. We have brought in competing and warring cultural groups to jostle for supremacy in a single territory, destroying the basis for a free society and underpinning the role of the state bureaucracy in “managing” cultural conflict. It is likely that, even were my approach adopted in full, England would remain host to minorities from many different cultures, but social peace could be created by insisting on the rightful dominance of English culture in England. In this way, we could defend the rights of all the English, and stop trampling on the interests of our own disadvantaged. This is the only way that liberty for the English can be restored, as multiculturalism requires state coercion of our own people for its success.

Miss, Mrs or Ms?

I once worked for a publishing company that insisted on the use of Ms, pronounced Mizz, to refer to a woman, rather than Mrs or Miss. Personally, I don’t think Mizz is a word in the English language, and so I cannot accept that Mizz is a correct title. We have been brainwashed into thinking that minx-like linguistic standards are now compulsory. They are not. There is nothing wrong with the traditional family – it is part of the natural order for the husband to be the head of the family, and we should certainly insist on the traditionally correct naming standards, e.g. Jane married to John Smith is Mrs John Smith, not Mrs Jane Smith. But as there are increasing numbers of women who do not reveal their marital status, I would suggest that if Mrs or Miss is deemed unacceptable, we use the correct 18th-century term, Mistress. This would apply to all women, married or not, and is the word from which Miss and Mrs are derived. In fact, where Ms is written, it should be deemed the abbreviation of Mistress, and read as Mistress, not Mizz, just as Mr is read out loud as Mister.

In the Irish context, there are two points to make. Firstly, there are no Irish equivalents of these words. An tUasal Seán Ó Briain is simply a nonsense in Irish, unless Seán Ó Briain is a nobleman, as the phrase literally means “the Nobleman, Seán Ó Briain”. I can’t for the life of me work out why some people use these forms. Another point is that in the Gaelic tradition, women retain their names throughout their lives. Máire Ní Cheallaigh retains that name even if she marries Seán Ó Briain. Attempts to “translate” Mrs O’Brien into Irish and come up with something like Máire, Bean Uí Bhriain, or Máire Uí Bhriain, are simply not Irish at all. Mr, Mrs, Miss and Ms do not have Irish equivalents.

REINING IN COPYRIGHT

The EU recently extended its copyright laws for audio recordings. Such recordings are now protected by copyright for 70 years, up from the previous 50-year term. Bizarrely, given the ephemeral nature of fashions in popular music, all recordings produced since 1941 are now in copyright. The campaign to extend copyright had been backed by the ageing singer, Cliff Richard, who stands to benefit financially from the change now that his 1959 number 1 hit Living Doll is back in copyright.

There has been a gradual creeping up of copyright terms, with a 120-year term in force in some cases in the US. It seems logical that there should be some copyright provision, but by the same token copyright laws seem out of kilter with any kind of reasonable approach. It seems amazing that in the case of printed works, copyright extends beyond the death of the author—and not just for a short while beyond his death, but for 70 years. The works of someone who died in 1942, some of which could have been written in the late nineteenth century, will still be covered by copyright. Of course this provides an income for his estate, but in no other walk of life is a profession expected to provide for relatives and heirs for 70 years after the person’s death. This provision is not currently extended to audio recording artists—although it is applied to composers and the writers of song lyrics—but an eventual extension of recording copyright to 70 years beyond the artist’s death has to be on the cards, given the general legislative drift in this area.

Copyright exerts a dead hand on culture. While writers need to make money and pharmaceutical companies need to be sure that expensive development of drugs will result in a profit, at some point writers’ works join the common heritage of culture, which belongs to us all, and drugs and industrial technology become part of the common pot of human innovation and invention that can rightly be drawn upon by all human beings. To argue for no copyright at all would seem to be misguided, but to argue for copyright of anything beyond 20 years restricts innovation, economic growth and the enjoyment and development of culture. This is because, in the first place, one person’s innovation forms the starting point for further innovation by others, and there must be a mechanism to move innovations into common use within a reasonable timeframe.

For famous cultural works, it is even clearer that they rapidly become part of society’s heritage and do not exclusively belong to the author/artist, but to all fans, readers and listeners, beyond a certain point. There is an irony in all this, of course, because the great works of Western European culture—works by Shakespeare, Dickens, Hardy, the Brontës, and compositions by Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, Brahms, Schubert, Schumann and Tchaikovsky—are generally out of copyright, although in the case of classical music, recordings are themselves subject to copyright provisions separate to those applying to the original compositions. Much of what passes for culture today—including Cliff Richard’s Living Doll—is meretricious pap for the masses. One could facetiously assert the rule that where anything was in copyright, it was by definition not worth reading or listening to. But regardless of whether the cultural production is itself of poor quality, the development of culture requires that works quickly exit copyright provision. Technological advancement also requires the sharing of inventions and scientific achievements.

In England, copyright dates back to the 1709 Act for the Encouragement of Learning that came into force in April 1710. That Act provided for a copyright term of 14 years for new works, and 21 years for books already in print. By 1731, when many works fell out of copyright, the issue came before the courts, resulting in decades of lawsuits, before the 1774 Donaldson v. Beckett case established that copyright was purely a creation of statute law; there was no common law right of copyright that publishers could fall back on. This is important for conservatives who see wisdom in our ancient common law: while modern economic realities require a development of the law, copyright law as currently in force has taken us a long way from the 14-year term originally enacted.

Copyright terms should be substantially reduced. As stated above, I would like to see a maximum 20-year term, and the immediate cessation of copyright with the death of the author/artist even where a 20-year term has not elapsed. Another issue of concern to me is the copyrighting of computer programmes. Many older computer programmes are no longer supported by developers, and computer programmes, unlike books and audio recordings, require support. It is still illegal to copy older versions of Microsoft programmes, and I would like to see 20-year maximum copyright term supplemented by an additional provision that computer programmes no longer supported by the developers fall automatically out of copyright.

An additional quirk of copyright is that many works are in copyright, although the books concerned are no longer in print. This bizarre and irrational circumstance means that those works are no longer available, despite the fact that the publisher had judged that there is no money to be made in republishing those works. If the publisher of George Orwell’s 1984 decided to stop publishing the work, it would be unavailable until 2020—70 years after George Orwell’s death—despite the fact that this is an important work in English culture, and that the publisher’s decision to stop publication had the effect of deleting a work from the canon of English literature. Publishers, writers and artists who had allowed works to fall out of circulation for more than 5 years should be deemed to have surrendered copyright to them. In the era of micropublishing and electronic publishing, it is simple for an author to maintain his works in circulation for the 20-year term I am advocating.

Crown copyright is another interesting area of law. The British Crown apparently retains copyright over the Authorised Version (King James Version) of the Bible, The Book of Common Prayer, Acts of Parliament and other works. Amazingly, the Crown copyright over the Authorised Version of the Bible, produced in 1611, is perpetual, although this is not respected by Anglicans abroad, and so the full text of that version of the Bible is available online. Perpetual Crown copyright of anything seems a nonsense, and even more so for a work produced in 1611 that is a core part of English culture. It seems logical to make clear by Act of Parliament that the Queen’s Coronation Oath implies a duty to defend the Authorised Version and The Book of Common Prayer, but that that is not any form of copyright. Consequently, the claim by Cambridge University Press that it has sole right to reproduce the Authorised Version in the UK after taking over Eyre and Spottiswoode, the descendant of the original office of the Queen’s Printer, in 1990 ought to be rejected. Acts of Parliament are by their nature to be widely available in order that the provisions of statutes enacted become widely known. Once again, the claim that there is “copyright” in an Act of Parliament is a nonsense. Acts of Parliament are available on a government website—yet Her Majesty’s Stationery Office has stated that it does not accept material on such websites to be freely reproducible.

I would like it to be made clear legally that no Crown copyright subsists in anything produced using public funds. While few people would be seeking to reproduce Acts of Parliament, a more interesting question arises regarding BBC output. The BBC is a quango, paid for from public funds (as the TV licence is just a hypothecated tax). Yet the corporation runs a profitable commercial operation based on the “copyright” in its programming. Some BBC programmes are available online via the iPlayer service, but many are not, with a notice claiming that copyright laws prevent redistribution of some programmes via iPlayer. As far as I am concerned, no copyright subsists in any of the BBC’s output. I would like all sporting events televised by the BBC to become freely available too.

Copyright on the Internet is an interesting question. While I would not like someone to assemble my articles into a book and make money from them, the nature of electronic publishing is that it is easy for the texts to be copied and distributed. Online copying and redistribution of something that primarily exists online (thus excluding MP3 files of audio recordings that have a prior existence as physical CDs, which ought to be covered by 20-year copyright), where not for commercial gain, should be deemed by law to be the logical consequence of one’s decision to publish anything online. The forwarding of an email is also the logical consequence of one’s decision to send an email to someone, and should not breach any copyright terms.

Furthermore, the creative use of “copyright” to cover personal letters is absurd. We were told that when Princess Diana’s letters to Captain James Hewitt were about to be published that Captain Hewitt owned the paper and ink the letters were written on, but Princess Diana’s estate owned the text and the copyright thereto. This is a nonsense. The owner of the letter owns the copyright to the text in the letter—and one should be careful not to send risqué letters to indiscrete people. I see no reason why Captain Hewitt should not make money from the publication of Princess Diana’s letters. A private letter is different from a published work, in that the text is privately owned and copyright should exist as long as the owner keeps the letter private—it is, after all, difficult to copy a letter the owner will not make available—whereas most copyright law refers to copyright over previously published material.

Finally, our economy needs to be based on real production (of industrial and cultural works) and not just on revenue collection from old works. We need innovation, sales and profits, not just the purely parasitical function of copyright revenue. The older advanced economies are ill-advised to depend on their technological lead and rest on their laurels by creaming off the profits from the adoption of their “intellectual property” in the developing world. If we do not produce anything of value now we will be overtaken. A revision, and scaling back, of copyright laws would be opposed internationally, where there are international agreements in place on the issue, but we need to assert the primacy of our own laws and establish the UK as a global centre for new, creative innovation once again.

The Paedophile Panic in England

The Paedophile Panic in England

I don’t have any interest in drawings of children being raped, but I know of no legitimate law where people could be imprisoned for drawing such a scene. However, this is apparently illegal in the UK today, and the first prosecution was brought recently under this law. See this article in the Daily Mail.

I have no objection to throwing the book at real paedophiles—people who sexually attack children—and would consider penalties much, much stiffer than any contemplated by our leading political parties—including the death penalty in many cases. Ironically, the police and the judicial establishment involved in the prosecution for drawings of sex with children are the very same criminal establishment who are opposed to the death penalty in the UK. In my book, the judges abet paedophilia by the judgments they hand down to serious paedophiles. A future conservative state could well retrospectively punish those judges involved.

Look at how strangely we are governed! We read a while back of how a young adult who raped a 6 year old was not given a detentionary sentence, because the “Christian” parents “forgave” him (but real forgiveness relates to forgiving something done to yourself: it was simply evil—Pharisaical sanctimony—for the parents to forgive him “vicariously” on behalf of their child), only for him to then rape a 7 year old. I would argue those parents, by their opposition to proper punishment for the rape of their child, are complicit in the rape of the 7 year old, and, if members of the Church of England, should be denied the sacrament until they have done penance for that. Nearly everything done in the name of Christianity today is contrary to the 2000 year old teachings of the church: those parents could indeed raise their child to try to forgive the perpetrator and leave punishment to the state and to God (as Romans 13 makes clear that the Christian church does see a God-given role in public punishment for crime), but to go out of their way to ensure such a paedophile remained on the streets is something else entirely. So it seems real cases of paedophilia don’t necessarily get condign punishment, whereas on the other hand, these drawings, which do not include any violent act on any child, are subject to punishment. Does anyone understand this?

The definition of paedophilia has become wider and wider. We have seen:

1. viewing pictures on the Internet equated with actual child rape (in a free society the police would have to have a good reason to believe you had actually engaged in sex with a minor before viewing anything on your computer anyway, and the possession of an easily copiable computer image should not be actionable at all, no matter how repugnant it makes the person downloading it);

2. the judicial insistence that all child nudity, including nudity where there is no sexual component, is pornographic, including pictures of children wearing no clothes at the seaside, whereas, no matter what the motivation of the adult taking the photographs (e.g., a paedophile could be using a camera on the beach), the image is simply not pornographic—it could only be held to be so where the judge himself were a paedophile… (actually…. I could believe that);

3. female teachers in their early twenties engaged in sexual relationships with pupils only five or six years younger than themselves are now held to be predatory paedophiles (they don’t exactly fit the profile for paedophiles jumping out of bushes to kidnap, rape and murder 5 year old children…); and

4. the drawing of imaginary pictures depicting paedophile scenes is now equated with physically raping a child.

It is worth asking (I don’t know from the Daily Mail article) the presumed age of the children in the drawings: there are “children” above the age of sexual maturity simply because the law says they are children (e.g., the age of consent varies from country to country), and then there is the real hardcore paedophilia of people who target those who are actually children.

I’m not suggesting, for example, that 15 year olds should be subject to predatory behaviour, but that there is a difference between the rape of a 7 year old (too young to know what is happening) and apparently consensual sex with someone a week before his/her 16th birthday, who is biologically mature, old enough to know what is happening, and only a “child” because we choose to keep young people in education until they are 16. Now, if I had a 15 year old child, I would be livid if some 45 year old were behaving lasciviously towards him or her—in social terms, 15 year oldd are not fully street-wise, and, owing to not having their own money yet, could be easily lured by a much older person. But physically, biologically, there is nothing strange about sexual attraction to a 15 year old. I defy ANYONE to show me that someone attracted to someone 16 years and 1 day old would not be attracted to someone 15 years and 364 days old. You could argue there must be a cut-off point (and the same argument would apply whatever the cut-off point), but 16 years of age is simply well above the age of sexual maturity.

In fact, I will go further: the policemen who, according to the very Act of Parliament we are discussing, are entitled to possess “pornographic images” for the purpose of cracking down on vice, are probably turned on by them. Tell me what heterosexual policeman working in the anti-paedo unit is not going to appreciate pictures of 15 year old girls he comes into contact with at work? And if there are any homosexual policemen in those units coming into contact with pictures of 15 year old boys, I think the number who will not enjoy the pictures (if the pictures are of attractive people) is going to be zero. So according to their own theory—the policemen themselves in those anti-paedo units are paedophiles themselves! In fact, I would say that every single policeman working in the anti-paedo unit is a paedophile, according to their own definition.

Now, I think taking advantage of a 15 year old should be some kind of offence, but it is not paedophilia as such. And it is not at all the same thing as the people who kidnap and force themselves on 7 year olds. My guess is that the number of people who are interested in actual children (pre-pubescent children) is extremely low—they are severely disturbed (lthough I would still argue for the death penalty for any of those who acted on their desire for pre-pubescent children), and there are probably no more than 100 of these (maybe much less) in the country as a whole, all very well known to the police and monitored in some way. Now, as for arrests for paedophilia—my guess is that in nearly all cases, we are dealing with people attracted to 15 year olds, or maybe 14 year olds (as, after all, these are also post-pubescent). Real paedophilia is very very rare indeed.

I could understand paedomania if we were not trying to sexualise children at a younger and younger age—but to go out of our way in the media, the education system and the wider culture to sexualise even pre-pubescent children (as well as sexualising post-pubescent 14 and 15 year olds, who would in the 1950s have still been pretty innocent even if biologically mature) and then suddenly claim that paedophilia is rife is a contradiction in terms. Let us not forget that the sexualisation of school pupils from the ages of 6 to 16 is the official policy of the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour Parties in the UK. Where teachers teach sex education to 14 and 15 year olds, I cannot believe there is no sexual tension in the class. Any red-blooded male who taught sex education to a class of people many of whom he objectively must be attracted to is going to be getting off on the whole experience.

I looked up this 2009 law on “drawings” (the Coroners and Justice Act 2009), and funnily enough it did say that the drawing was illegal even if some features appeared not to be of a child, i.e., where “the predominant impression conveyed is that the person shown is a child despite the fact that some of the physical characteristics shown are not those of a child.” You could even see the humour in this—what they are talking about is a drawing of a child with an outsized penis! Even though the penis would be bigger than that expected of a child, if the overall image appeared to be of a child, it would be illegal. In fact,that law states that the relevant age for illegal drawings is not 16 but 18. Where do I start on this? It is legal to have sex with a 16 year old, but not to draw that same person nude? Young people aged 16 are serving in the army, but are children for the purposes of photographs and drawings? So it is not paedophilia if you just want to have sex with a 16 year old, but the moment you get your camera out, you are a paedophile? And the police claim to be able to distinguish a drawing of a 17 year old from a drawing of an 18 year old—what nonsense is this?

It is easy to go down the kneejerk route and say that people who are sexually interested in those under the age of 16 (or 18, in the case of images) should have no rights—but we should think of how close the state is moving into all our lives. When the state can monitor your drawings, there is really no private sphere left. You will notice that the case in that Daily Mail article is described as a “landmark” case—in other words, a case making new case law that will begin to be more widely applied. While it is true that the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 does say “references to an image of a child include references to an image of an imaginary child”—so this is not one of the many cases where new laws are being made by judges—statute laws that are an abuse of power are also of great concern to me. Moreover, while there is a statute law promoting the paedophile panic, we need to bear in mind that judicial interpretation still plays the key role. (It will largely be a matter of interpretation where a judge decides that a drawing is  of a 17 year old and not of an 18 year old). We are a grossly overgoverned country, not least because we allow ourselves to be taken in by these moral panics.

Guilt, or self-righteousness?

For conservatives prepared to consider the proposition that there is some kind of fundamental distinction between Western culture and that of the other civilisations of the world, the distinction is sometimes seen in terms of morality. We are, according to this interpretation, a more moral people. We can see this most readily in terms of a contrast with the East Asian civilisation. In China, the interests of the collective (family, nation, state) override moral considerations. Chinese people who know of their government’s use of late-term forced abortions to enforce the national family planning policy often simply deny that anything of the sort takes place; or, when presented with evidence, they get angry and start shouting. Anyone who has lived in China will know that discussions of Chinese brutality towards China’s own ethnic minorities proceed in a very unfruitful way. The Chinese government is prepared to peddle the most transparent lies, such as claiming that a small group of Tibetan refugees, shot dead by China’s border guards for fleeing the country, as shown on a mountaineer’s videotape, actually attacked the border guards. Lies come easier to the Chinese, which is why we call them “inscrutable”: we cannot gauge their moral sensibility.

The abuse whereby Chinese workplace bosses would refuse to allow their employees to marry—they were required to sign the documents—unless the bride first gave her virginity to the boss has been stymied by a change in the law, which does not now require workplace approval for the match, but sexual abuse in the workplace is not only rife, but standard, in China. The parents who lost their children in the Sichuan earthquake of 2009 were arrested for protesting over the schoolhouses that collapsed like jelly as the money for school construction had been siphoned off by corrupt officials. Of the 80-odd earthquake orphans who were disabled as a result of the earthquake, not one—not a single one, according to the Chinese press—found a family in the world’s most populous nation willing to adopt him. As far as most moral issues are concerned, the Chinese do not really seem to “care”.

We care. It is what we do as Westerners. We are the nations intent on building up geo-political rivals by subsidies and technological transfer. Hillary Clinton cares about the rioting Egyptians (although apparently much less about the displaced Palestinians in much worse circumstances). From racism to sexism to homophobia to destruction of the environment, Western political views are directly informed by a sort of cod-altruism. We are worried about the plight of slaves in Mauritania and about child labour in Pakistan. And such supposed “altruism” feeds directly into the politics of guilt: it is “unfair” that other nations are poorer than we; we were the ones who engaged in the triangular slave trade; we are not doing enough to help the homosexuals of Iran; the underclass in Britain cannot be expected to control their own fertility, even in the age of the “morning-after pill”, and so it would be “unfair” not to subside their unproductive lifestyles; and the death penalty for cold-blooded killers would be cruel, as social disadvantage is deemed to play a key role in such individuals’ personalities.

Clearly we are different from the other civilisations of the earth. And it is not just the Chinese who fail to measure up to our moral standards. While the Islamic civilisation includes a large and unbending moral component, one of the key things that stands out is the cruel use of state power to enforce their moral code. For some reason, Islam never set out to create individuals who were morally upright; it did not set out to build individuals who did not need cruel punishments to stay in line. Hilaire Belloc’s wonderful tale, The Mercy of Allah, sets out an understanding of Muslim society that is every bit as selfish and greedy as Chinese society. To rob others, unbeknown to them until you are far off, is shown in that book as viewed as “the mercy of Allah”, who facilitates the crime. Christian concern for others, even those you do not know, does not seem to be present in those societies. In Britain itself, the paedophilia and sexually predatory behaviour of young Muslim men, long suppressed as an item of news, has recently hit the headlines. What surprises you is that such behaviour is not rare or a fringe activity, but one participated in by large numbers of Muslim youths working together. Crime statistics are apparently “top secret” in the UK, but statistics from a range of Western countries confirm the prevalence of crime among the non-European part of the population. In Sweden, for example, the still demographically small first- and second-generation immigrant population is responsible for a large majority of rapes and sexual assaults.

True, violent crime is less common in China, where it is the overwhelming social norm for men to frequent brothels, and the lower level of violence can also be explained by higher average IQ levels in East Asia, which produce a fairly stable population, who prefer to use their intelligence to rip others off financially than to use their fists or force themselves on lone women. Indian and Pakistani doctors in the UK are known for “feeling up” their female patients—presumably in their culture they would get away with this behaviour, and “anti-racism” ensures they often do in Britain too. Real hard violence, as a social norm, is, however, rather found in the African-descended part of the population, who lack the IQs of the Chinese and the economic prospects of everyone else. Many geneticists believe that not only IQs but also the tendency towards aggression is coded for in human genes, and further solid information on this subject is eagerly awaited by conservatives.

So it seems clear that there is a real difference between the West and the other civilisations. This is not to deny that bad behaviour has not become much more prevalent among the Western underclass, possibly as a side function of state sponsorship of sexual incontinence and unmarried motherhood. The “wigger” phenomenon suggests that British youths are modelling themselves on their Afro-Caribbean counterparts, with negative social consequences. However, these phenomena are the result of the distorted morality or guilt of the Western middle classes, who have allowed bad behaviour to take root rather than being “judgmental”. This produces the curious circumstance that, whereas other civilisations, such as Islam, are unofficially immoral, in contrast to the full Islamic law, which would be unbendingly moral, we now officially support immoral lifestyles. Islamic revulsion at Western society has been frequently described in the press: it seems that calls for social integration fall on deaf ears, when that society smiles at images of young women drunk and half-naked lying on the pavement. At least officially, in their own communities, the Muslim leaders are not afraid to denounce immorality. It seems we are both more “caring” and less strict on the moral front than they are, or at least claim to be; there is a good deal of evidence that private moral behaviour is much worse in the Muslim community than it would be in mainstream Britain.

This produces a complicated picture. How can we be more moral if we are morally lax? The solution seems to lie in the cod-altruism mentioned earlier. Western society, and particularly Anglo-Saxon society, is noted for its sanctimonious and self-righteous tone. Western society functions as a competition for moral status, a game of moral “one-upmanship”. I think this explains the pretence of altruism: by displaying your concern for others, you prove your superiority to others, in this game at least. Free Tibet! I’d rather pay a bit more in tax! Save the whale! One of my best friends is black! We mustn’t be judgmental! All these are particular manifestations of the game of moral status.

Actually, the self-righteous do not actually give a damn about any one of their causes. I have tried to winkle out the bottom line of their altruism: when the self-righteous witter on about their concern for the 3,000 desaparecidos of Chile, I ask them if they are as concerned about the 30,000 members of the Matabele tribe slaughtered by the anti-imperialist, Robert Mugabe, in Zimbabwe. That generally leads to a tense conversation: their eyes glaze over, they refuse to listen to any more facts and get angry. Yet, if they really were altruistic, they would care about deaths at the hands of anti-imperialists too. It was shown at one point in the Somali famine that the agricultural situation had recovered in that country, but the fact that Western food donations kept rolling in made farmers reluctant to cultivate their fields. Why would it make any difference to the self-righteous if they were actually harming the Somalis by their vaunted “kindness”? Does it make any difference to them that the welfare benefits system has led to a large rise in the numbers of children brought up by single mothers? And that that situation is linked, in one of the strongest statistical links in the social sciences, with crime, delinquency, drug abuse, and the physical and sexual abuse of the children, often by their mothers’ string of “partners”?

If we are “moral”, we are moral in a way that is largely intended to flatter ourselves. That is why the objects of our concern are so curiously selective. In the 1990s, we were oh-so-concerned about the driving of the Bosnian Muslims out of their “safe havens”, which we viewed as part of a wonderful attempt to create a multi-ethnic society (ahem! among people killing each other), and yet the driving of the Croatian Serbs out of their “protected areas” failed to provoke a similar reaction. It was ordinary people who bore the brunt in both cases. It could be said that Western people are idealistic, and that they pick out the cases to show concern over with a careful eye on what would make themselves look good morally.

That is not to say that self-righteousness is not connected in some way with real morality. The fact that in most of these cases people are being treated in ways that would call for compassion—especially if you were a member of that society, and rather less credibly if you are just enjoying the sensation of concern via the television screen—is what the claim to altruism rests upon. To that extent, it seems that “youthful idealism” is used by a more cynical class of free riders to stake out their own claim to moral superiority, while not really giving a damn. I am a long way from condemning genuine altruism, although it would be very rare, and I do not think I have come across it in British society. Anyone who is really concerned about the starving millions in Africa would sell his house and give the money to the starving. I would not discourage anyone from doing so, as long as no-one else (for example, wife and children) were affected, in which case imposing suffering on them would not be genuinely altruistic. Quite simply, I myself do not care about the starving in Ethiopia—it is a very abstract concept to me, and charity is better directed to one’s own immediate community—but then neither do the self-righteous; the difference is, I do not feel the need to indulge in gesture politics on the issue.

Self-righteousness has become the moral stance of the British elite, many of whom are making large sums out of their concern for others. I am sure senior civil servants, bureaucrats in the health service, headmasters on six-figure salaries in failing schools, “quango queens” and charity directors all tell themselves that they are handsomely rewarded for their superior morality. They are all trying to do good, or so they tell themselves, and if they are actually imposing a financial burden on the low-paid, siphoning money off from front-line healthcare, teaching trendy subjects they know will damage the life chances of their pupils, wasting money on fatuous and politically motivated campaigns, and even directing money collected as “charitable donations” into their final-salary pension funds, they are able to rationalise it in some way to themselves. How lucrative “caring” has become! Quite often these people are prepared to siphon off large sums of money into overseas projects (collecting their salaries on the way). I would argue that the Chinese-style naked pursuit of self-interest at least has the advantage of allowing the Chinese to support their own society. They do not have to pretend to care about the Sudan, and so they can keep all their money in China. And they do not need to feign concern about the human rights of murderers, and so are free to support the death penalty and keep China a stable, low-crime society. And the Muslim society of wealthy Saudi Arabia sees no need to fund unmarried motherhood, so helping to ensure that most children in that society are brought up by both of their real parents. Amazing, is it not, how self-interest often fosters a healthy society?

How did Western society become so self-righteous? Is this merely a phenomenon of the twentieth century as our Christian culture receded? I would argue that the sanctimoniousness of the elite, and their middle-class hangers-on, has huge material advantages for the elite, in that it has vastly expanded the size of the state, but there are other advantages too for the elite of this form of self-righteousness. Whereas traditional morality required them to set a social example themselves, the new form of cod-morality requires nothing of them personally. You can be a serial divorcer and abandoner of children, and as long as you are passionate anti-racist and concerned about global warming, you are still a good person today. The cod-morality requires nothing more than occasional lip-service, whereas traditional morality was a tight life-long straitjacket of behaviour. We have reached the point where morality is what you say and not what you do. A pleasant person who never does anything to harm others, but voices his opposition to immigration—I would put myself in this category—is deemed in self-righteous circles to be a “nasty individual”, based entirely on his views. Someone who has ruined the lives of his wife and children has only to mouth platitudes to become accepted in the best company.

Clearly, though, self-righteousness is connected to our erstwhile morality. Even in the old days, those who were determined to be seen to be behaving in line with the church’s moral precepts were seen as self-righteous. They cultivated their moral images every bit as much as the new elite cultivate theirs. From one point of view, the change in society has been nothing more than a shift in the focus of morality, from sexual to racial matters. Incidents such as the persecution of the witches of Salem in early America show that the same tendency to self-righteousness, together with a taste for persecuting others that is very much alive in the new political correctness, has been there all along. Yet the difference is that the old self-righteousness of the family and the church fostered a good society: it held the fabric of the family and nation together. The new self-righteousness is destructive of the fabric society because it opposes the family and the nation, and it is for that reason, and not its mere sanctimonious tone (unbearable though that is), that I oppose it.

Finally, the church itself warned of self-righteousness and judgmentalism. The Pharisees of Jesus’ day were probably not engaging in any form of immorality, but it was their self-righteousness that offended Jesus, who condemned them as “whited sepulchres”. A nation steeped in the Bible was on the look-out for self-righteousness, and this at least meant that a genuine difference between real morality and the cultivation of a fake moral image was clear to all members of society back then. Could it be that, as we have in the main abandoned Christianity, we no longer see the distinction between righteousness and self-righteousness? That having been weaned off the Bible, we take claims of morality at face value?

It was always a problem for the Christian church that it called for righteousness and condemned unrighteousness while claiming to oppose self-righteousness too. Is it not self-righteous to tell others to be righteous? I can only square that circle myself with the concept of a nation that is Christian, rather than individuals who are Christian. At one stage, Englishmen were told they were “building Jerusalem”, that England must become the kingdom of God on earth. It was not a messianic vision of the Second Coming of Christ, but was rather a messianic vision of a good society, right here in England. Once the values that were once seen as moral and right are assimilated by the majority of society, it becomes harder for one individual to stake a greater claim to morality by adhering to them. They were once the norm in society. True, there were individuals hamming up their devotion to God, but there was nothing unusual back then about loving your wife “till death do us part” and bringing up your children to behave themselves. This moral tone was what was great about England—we were individuals with integrity, not individuals who it took the strictures of a cruel and barbaric shari’ah law to keep in line. The goal of the Church of England was never merely to create moral individuals, but to create a society where moral behaviour was the accepted social norm. Whether the theology of the Bible was true or not, it is a fact of history that the “new personality” spoke of by St Paul was put on by many—the majority?—of Englishmen, and that a society that worked on its precepts brought the religion of Christianity alive regardless of the facts of science and history.

So it seems to me that our traditional morality has metamorphosised into the self-righteousness, the cod-morality, of our new elite. Having been profoundly influenced by the Gospels, our nation was ripe for the emergence of anti-racism and various forms of synthetic outrage to replace the old certainties. Is this some kind of original cultural flaw in the Western societies? Does our oft-proclaimed moral superiority conceal a tendency towards self-deception and gesture politics? The irony is, when the Western civilisation was at its height, it was better than the rest of them put together!

A libertarian approach to family values

We live in the era of so-called “women’s rights”. I am not sure that women’s rights could only have been interpreted in a way that has weakened the traditional family. But that is the situation that now obtains in England today. My interest lies not in opposing women’s rights, as far as the latter is a self-sustaining ideological movement and not achieved via state fiat, but rather in the traditional family, and, in particular, in the role that it has in supporting the social fabric. Continue reading

Who rules Britain?

The basic question of politics is “who does what to whom?” This was put a little more succintly in Russian by Vladimir Lenin as “kto, kogo”, “who? whom?” He was a Marxist with a fondness for class analysis of society, but that does not reduce the force of his view that the fundamental facts behind any society are who the ruling class are and who the ruled.
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Punishing patriots

We read today of how British patriots working in the Inland Revenue paid less child benefit to people quaintly referred to as “non-nationals”. They have been sacked, in a disgraceful, politically inspired abuse of power by Revenue bosses. Who are non-nationals? And why are we subsidising them anyway? These people should be getting medals, not the sack. An ethnic supremacist called Patrick Yu, chief executive of some unconstitutional body called the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities, applauded the sackings — but do non-Chinese get money from the Chinese taxpayer? I am sick and tired of the scroungers and the ethnic supremacists who are their spokesmen. Naturally all the newspapers — largely spokesrags for the ethnic lobby nowadays, including the Daily Mail and the Telegraph — claimed the Revenue men were “racist” — without even bothering to ask why money is being handed out to non-citizens. Don’t get me started either on those of our “citizens” who are not members of our nation — the whole thing has become confused. Non-nationals should not get our social security, and ethnic minorities should not be “nationals” of this country.

Towards a new foreign policy

A recent blogpost on VDARE.com expressed the view that the UK will be on India’s side in the eventual struggle for global dominance between China and India, whereas Australia would be pro-Chinese, and the US position is unclear. It is time we reconsidered our long-term foreign policy in the UK. Our overall strategy appears to be drifting, with continuance of the US lapdog strategy that has been in place for a long time, and a foot in the European camp too. But the US will not always be the leading power in the world, and will not always be an Anglo-Saxon-dominated (or in US parlance, “WASP”) country.
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Religion in an Age of Unbelief

Religion and politics do not mix, they say. However, there was a time when Christianity—specifically, Anglicanism—was at the very heart of what it meant to be a Tory. It is arguably the case that multiculturalism, and our ongoing expropriation as a nation, could never have taken root in our country without the collapse of belief in religion, especially organised religion, which in the form of the Church of England is or was essentially the English nation at prayer. Even so, many members of our nation, cannot bring themselves to regret the passing of what they see as superstition and self-righteousness. I would like to explain to them why atheists, agnostics and Christians should support the restoration of our national faith and the traditions that surround it to their rightful position at the heart of English—and British—culture. Religion and politics must mix if there is to be a political defence of our culture.
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